Comprehensive Peace Agreement Sudan

When South Sudanese voted in favour of secession from Sudan on 9 July 2011 and became an independent state on 31 May 2011, the Secretary-General sent a letter from the Sudanese government to the Security Council. The Sudanese government had decided to end THE presence of UNMIS on 9 July 2011.1 Nevertheless, the Government of South Sudan had requested a follow-up mission to South Sudan. Given the complexity and fragility of South Sudan`s regional environment, the concerns and challenges facing internal security, and the challenges of building the institutional capacity of the State and protecting the civilian population, the Secretary-General recommended the creation of a multidimensional United Nations operation in South Sudan (MANUS) for four years under Chapter VI. The recommended military force was 7,000 soldiers (of all ranks) and 900 police officers.2 The UN Security Council established UNSAM on 9 July 2011 for a first period of one year through its 1996 resolution. The mission was tasked with “consolidating peace and security and helping to create the conditions for development in order to strengthen the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and to establish good relations with its neighbours.” 3 The ceasefire provision of the agreement obliges both sides to involve and reintegrate other armed groups. In this context, the President of the Government of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, and the leaders of other armed groups negotiated their participation in the governments of the Southern States10.10 The ceasefire agreement commits both sides to speed up the process of integration and reintegration of armed groups allied to both sides. The process continued in 2005. I very much appreciate the honour of speaking today to the Peace Research Institute of Khartoum University. The U.S. Peace Institute to which I belong is like the PRI, which is committed to ending violent conflict and promoting peace. I think we all agree that these goals are often barely out of our reach.

In Sudan and South Sudan, despite years of intense negotiations, several agreements and the work of so many, peace has not only been difficult to grasp, but also totally lost in South Sudan and parts of Sudan. Nevertheless, we cannot despair or withdraw from this work. Too many people are suffering, too much potential is lost, there is too much risk of losing even more lives, that we must intensify our work, if at all. I am therefore pleased that our two institutes are in close contact to see how we can intensify our efforts for peace. 1.14 The national government is not reluctant to allocate an allowance because of a state or regional government or the government of South Sudan. Each level of power can initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Court if any other institution or level withholds funds due. The national government grants transfers to the government of South Sudan on the basis of established principles. (Footnote: the question of nomenclature is resolved in the power-sharing agreement) 17.7.

The JDB is responsible for developing a comprehensive framework for building trust. Confidence-building measures between the SAF and the SPLA may include the exchange of visits, the organisation of cultural and sporting events, the convening of joint training and participation in national and religious celebrations, as well as any other activities aimed at building confidence. The peace process continued amid repeated violations of the ceasefire provisions of the agreement. The parties supported the integration of other armed groups into existing military structures and the creation of functional MOCs. The implementation of Joint Integrated Unites training to provide a ceasefire was 18 months behind schedule.

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